



















In this paper we will consider what it means to ‘recover’ from Myalgic Encephalomyelitis, or chronic fatigue syndrome (ME/CFS). ME/CFS is a controversial illness which debilitates sufferers (Clayton, 2015; Hammond, 2002, Goudsmit et al, 2009). The pain suffered is claimed to be comparable with end stage renal disease and more disabling than multiple sclerosis, mononucleosis, acute myocardial infarction and type II diabetes (Komaroff, 1995). Whilst there is some literature examining treatments (e.g. White et al, 2011), the experience of recovery from the condition has so far not been thoroughly explored in the literature. The dominant discourses through which ME/CFS is understood tend to emphasise the persistence and intractability of the symptoms (Grue, 2013; Krzeczkowska et al, 2015; Pemberton and Cox, 2014). Consequently, there is little material available concerned with recovery, barring a small number of long term outcome studies emphasising persistent impairment (Brown et al, 2012) and case reports (Burgess and Chalder, 2011). What is far less readily available in the literature is any account of the experience and meaning of recovery to people who have undergone some remission of their symptoms and who have attempted to resume former activities.  

Myalgic Encephalitis as a ‘contested illness’. 

Like many contested illnesses, ME/CFS has an ambiguous status vis a vis the medical profession. The condition is characterised by a broad range of symptoms which include joint and muscle pain, extreme fatigue, un-refreshing sleep, dizziness, brain fog, memory loss, impaired cognitive function, headaches, flu-like feelings, irritable bowel symptoms, photophobia and ‘exertion intolerance’ (Action for ME, 2010; Institute of Medicine, 2015). Symptoms vary in type and intensity between individuals which makes identifying an aetiology and appropriate treatment problematic, which in turn fuels challenges to the ‘legitimacy’ of the illness. Controversy surrounds all aspects of the illness including its diagnosis, aetiology, prevalence, duration and the most appropriate form of treatment (Horton-Salway, 2002, 2004; Banks & Prior 2001; ME Research UK, 2010). 

The lived experience of ME/CFS has been detailed in previous work (Anderson et al, 2014) but there is so far no published material on the lived experience of recovery from the syndrome. Whilst Arroll and Howard (2013) have characterised the process of living with ME in the longer term as ‘post-traumatic growth’, so far research has tended to focus on symptoms which persist and whose severity continues unabated. The contested and variable nature of the condition means compiling recovery data is problematic, so for those whose symptoms eventually abate, the ambiguity of their status is deepened. They are in a particularly marginal position as regards health and illness and it could therefore be said that their position is what Victor Turner (1969) has called a liminal one. 

Whether to label the illness ME or CFS is one area in particular that is hotly debated amongst lay people and medical professionals, as each name implies different meanings about the origins of the illness. The term ME, as coined by Ramsey (1956) is thought to be preferable to CFS by the majority of sufferers because it is perceived as implying a stronger physiological basis for the condition, and is ‘less psychological’ than a diagnosis of CFS (Horton-Salway, 2004; ME Action UK, 2010). The term CFS on the other hand was devised in 1988 (Holmes et al., 1988) in order to address the apparent lack of physiologically verifiable support for a diagnosis of ME. Here fatigue is considered to be the main element of ME/CFS, with other symptoms being regarded as caused by fatigue or as psychosomatic in origin. Thus, to sufferers, a diagnosis of CFS is often regarded as akin to being diagnosed with a psychological illness. The apparently opposing stances of the medical and lay perspective of the illness means that sufferers may construe the medical profession as delegitimising and psychologising their illness (Shepherd, 2004; Van Damme et al., 2006) but their insistence that the illness is physical in nature can lead the medical profession to class sufferers as illness-fixated or apt to adopt an unduly medical frame of reference to make sense of their symptoms (Tamm & Soderlund, 1994).

This debate has consequences for the treatment options available to sufferers, as the UK’s NHS offers only Cognitive Behavioural Therapy (CBT), Graded Exercise Therapy (GET) and anti-depressants (Morriss, 2014). Sufferers and some medical professionals question whether these are appropriate, and an All Party Parliamentary Group (APPG, 2010) suggested a review of these treatments because of the high level of patient complaints. These complaints have arisen amid concerns over the effectiveness of CBT (Shepherd, 2001, Malouff, 2008) and the possibility that GET can cause deteriorations in an individuals’ health (Knoop et al., 2007).





Liminality is a term used in sociology and anthropology to denote phenomena which fail to fit into categories that people decree as normal (Van Gennep, 1909; Jackson, 2005), as they fall ‘betwixt and between’ socially constructed categories (Turner, 1969). As Turner defined them, liminal individuals or entities are “neither here nor there; they are betwixt and between the positions assigned and arrayed by law, custom, convention, and ceremony” (1969: 95). For Van Gennep and Turner, liminality was a phase between separation and assimilation, where an individual is first separated, that is stripped of the social status that he or she possessed before the ritual, inducted into the liminal period of transition, and finally given his or her new status and reassimilated into society.

Sibbett (2005) proposes that people enter a liminal state where they are suspended between life and death as soon as they suspect that they may be ill. For example, Little et al. (1998) suggests that for cancer patients, confirmation of the illness leads to a period of acute liminality whereby the patient loses their autonomy because they are required to submit to the treatment regimen. Once this acute phase and immediate danger has passed the patient enters a chronic state of illness and a sustained liminality which persists for the remainder of the patient’s life, even if they recover. The apparent longevity of the liminal state is attributed to both the constant reminders of illness such as bodily changes and the need for medical check-ups (Little et al., 1998) or the recurrent nature of illness (Thompson, 2007). In this respect, writers on liminality in health have modified the concept beyond its original formulation by Turner. In ritual, said Turner, the liminal period was often of defined duration and ended with the reassimilation of the person to society. There is also an agreed social definition among the wider community of when the liminal state should begin and end as people progress through the lifecourse from one status to another – from single to married, from citizen to chieftain and so on – whereas this is far less clear in studies of health and illness.  

In the sociology of health, when an illness does not fit into the medically defined categories of being either physical or psychological in origin and it appears to transgress both, it incurs a liminal status (Honkasalo, 2001). In the case of chronic pain, Jackson (2005) suggested that people who transcend boundaries in this way are perceived similarly to hypochondriacs or malingerers, and incur a comparable stigma. Jackson’s findings correspond to ME/CFS sufferer’s experiences because it is also a contested illness, sharing many similarities with chronic pain, including an unclear aetiology and an unspecified severity and duration. In this respect the experience of liminality differs from Turner’s formulation because of the ill-defined nature of the problem, and because for Turner, liminal individuals were clearly outside social structures, norms and institutions. In the case of illness experience there is a much more involved relationship between those suffering symptoms and the institutions of healthcare and the frameworks of knowledge sanctioned by biomedicine, sufferers’ support groups as well as complementary and alternative approaches. 

In order to trace some of these complexities, in this paper we will extend the notion of liminality to include the experience of recovery from the contested illness of ME/CFS. It appears that recovery from ME/CFS represents an unprecedented set of circumstances that may impinge on individual’s ability to resume a normal life. Firstly ME/CFS falls into the category of contested illness which implies that sufferers incur a liminal status during the severe phase of the condition. ME/CFS is also a category from which a recovery is considered to be rarely possible and not usually documented. Secondly because of its medically unverifiable status, recovery from ME/CFS is usually self-defined rather than via medical authority. Therefore in the present study, it was deemed appropriate to examine whether the construct of liminality could usefully illuminate the hitherto under-explored experience of full or partial recovery from ME/CFS.

Methodology, procedure and participants
The interviews in this paper form part of a larger longitudinal qualitative study, for the first author’s PhD, which focuses on the work-related experiences of people with ME/CFS and those claiming to have recovered. The first author’s interest in ME/CFS experiences emerged following a family member’s diagnosis, which led to an intensive study of the literature and a period of involvement with ME/CFS voluntary and support groups. This prior knowledge and the centrality of personal and group interpretations of illness experience, as well as the researcher’s longer term involvement in the lives of the participants studied, suggested grounded theory (Glaser & Strauss, 1967) as an appropriate analytical tool, an approach well-established in chronic illness literature (Charmaz, 2001).

Following review of the study protocol by the host institution’s ethics committee, 36 participants were recruited for the study as a whole, and a subset of 16 people (11 women and 5 men) claiming recovery from ME/CFS was selected for this paper. Participants were derived from a number of sources across the UK, including invitations to members of ME/CFS support groups, on-line forums and ‘participant driven’ sampling (Tiffany, 2006). The data reported here derive from semi-structured interviews which were conducted with each participant in which they were encouraged to tell their story of ME/CFS and recovery. The questions concerned their initial illness experience and the effect this has had upon their lives. Whenever participants talked about remission in their symptoms, they were prompted to describe how the recovery process began and how their lives altered after their recovery. 

The interviews were recorded, transcribed and each transcript was initially read and coded for emergent themes. These themes were revisited and added to as necessary following reading and coding of the subsequent transcripts, thus ensuring that any emergent theory remained grounded in the data. Here grounded theory proved worthwhile as the data produced some unanticipated findings by highlighting the unique manner in which participants constructed and articulated their recovery. The disclosure of recovery narratives on the part of the 16 participants whose accounts form the foundation for this paper, and their descriptions of the ‘betwixt and between’ state invited a comparison with Turner’s notion of liminality, and were unanticipated at the outset of the study. These unique data attest to the strength of this approach and its value in yielding novel findings. 









Among participants who claimed to have recovered, a key feature was the sense they gave of having taken responsibility for their illness. The diagnostic process often appeared to have been prolonged, involving several trips to the GP prior to diagnosis. Like many other contested illnesses, some participants recalled researching potential diagnoses themselves, leading them to raise the possibility of ME/CFS with the doctor.

‘I said to him [the doctor] ‘could this is ME?’ and he just sat there and said ‘yes’ and I was quite taken aback by that’. (Dina).

Doctors sometimes appeared reluctant to diagnose ME/CFS particularly if there was an alternative psychological explanation available (Asbring & Navanen, 2003). This meant that the transition between what Turner (1969), and Van Gennep (1909), might describe as the pre-liminal and the liminal state was often self-defined, rather than receiving immediate formal sanction by the medical profession. This process of ‘separation’ in Van Gennep’s terms represented a separation from an earlier life, but also a separation from the forms of intelligibility available when one has a better defined, more widely recognised illness. 

Once participants received a diagnosis they described themselves as quickly becoming aware that they would be reliant on their own resources, consistent with experiences of other chronic illnesses where lack of input can lead patients to view the medical profession as unable or unwilling to help (Eccleston et al, 1997): 

‘They told me what I’d got, they offered me some antidepressants [laughs] and sent me on my way, said there was nothing they could do really and that was it’ (Janet). 

Being offered anti-depressants was a contentious issue amongst the participants, who took it to imply that their illness was being dismissed as psychological, and many refused to take them. Some participants accepted them, usually after the GP stated they were for treating aspects of ME/CFS, such as pain or sleep problems, rather than for depression, thus remaining consistent with the ME/CFS community’s position that the illness is not psychological in origin. 

As literature surrounding ME/CFS suggests (Denz-Penhey & Murdoch, 1993), the tendency within medicine to regard the illness as a psychological one causes participants to feel ostracised by the medical profession and ultimately responsible for their condition:
‘I felt at the time that I was completely on my own, and so I I, sort of, did a lot of research myself, of treatments’ (Izzie).
Once they were placed in the liminal position of having a contested diagnosis, this was further compounded by the lack of a definitive treatment. Typically, participants recounted being ‘happy to try anything’, before finding a beneficial course of action. Adopting pro-active approaches was important for participants:
‘I was prepared to try anything. I was just trying to find a solution, always trying to find a solution and so I tried a number of things. The minute someone told me about caffeine I gave up caffeine immediately y’know. I was just trying to do everything to get better the whole time’ (Jack).
Presenting oneself as a pro-active agent, urgently seeking recovery was consistent throughout the data, as was being willing to adapt one’s lifestyle to eradicate anything that may be regarded as contributing to the illness. This pro-active stance also counters the potential association of ME/CFS with depression, and deflected any implication that they were somehow complicit with the illness or that it could be perpetuated by apathy.

This type of self-informing and self-help is popular for patients with both contested and medically verified illnesses where there is a wealth of popular self-help literature suggesting that adopting certain behaviours, specific diets, exercise and vitamin supplements are beneficial (Henwood et al, 2003). Participants were placed in the liminal situation of often feeling very ill, but with a diagnosis that they felt was not taken seriously; outside the grid of intelligibility provided by more established illnesses, and without a treatment which is generally believed to be helpful or consistently available (McDermott et al, 2015). This means that participants were stranded between being legitimately, medically ill and being well. It is possible that the self-driven recovery was a way of managing this ‘betwixt and between’ liminal status. Unlike the rituals described by Van Gennep and Turner, then, there is little by way of a socially sanctioned path back to an intelligible identity or role in the case of ME/CFS. However, there is an equivalent of what Turner (1969) describes as communitas, a sort of egalitarian fellow feeling amongst sufferers. Hence the importance many ascribe to support groups (Barker, 2008; de Carvalho-Leite et al 2011), where members are expert by experience rather than through official medical knowledge (Horton-Salway, 2004). 

Clarifying the meaning of recovery

Being outside the normal, medically sanctioned categories of illness, and with limited agreement in the literature on what recovery involves, participants were therefore presented with a challenge in categorising improvements in their condition. In other words recovery was not simply a matter of passing from a medically verified, externally sanctioned illness to a recovered, post liminal state. In Van Gennep’s view, liminality was an ambiguous phase but one in which there was very little freedom of movement because of the constraints of the ritual process. Here however there was somewhat more fluidity. As we shall see later, improvements in symptoms deepened the liminal nature of the experience rather than relieved it. Participants were apt to construct their own formulation of recovery and devised their own specific measuring systems comparing pre-illness, illness and post-illness levels of impairment and capability. Dina used percentages to describe her level of recovery at specific points in the recovery process:
‘I think by this time I was already about 70% recovered’ (Dina).
This allowed Dina to keep an account of her incremental improvements, up to her present level of being 90% recovered. So did Sally: 
‘I would class myself as still having ME, but, being at something, well, around about ninety five percent function’ (Sally). 
Sally positions herself between people that are ill with ME/CFS and people that are completely well, but is somehow closer to being well. However, levels of recovery may fluctuate: 
‘On a good day, I’m sort of ninety percent’ (Dawn).
It was notable that some female participants used this system to convey their position of being almost or mostly recovered, which lies between the pre-defined categories of being ill and being well. On the other hand, male participants tended to be more definite about their status and used terms such as ‘fully recovered’ and ‘done with it’ to communicate their levels of activity and therefore equate themselves to being well. However, regardless of their self-defined recovery status, participants also measured and recorded their ability to perform specific tasks, as Dina notes below:
‘I remember when I first went back into the swimming pool here I did 5 lengths and everybody said ‘Oh that’s marvellous’ and I said ‘no its not I used to do 30’...but now I can swim 20 lengths’ (Dina).
Dina gauges her incremental progress towards recovery in a way which also helps to portray her as continually striving to improve her condition. This was a common feature in the data, which again serves to dispel any insinuation that the illness is caused by apathy or depression. Pip uses his participation in physical exercise to describe changes in his condition.
‘I was well when I was doing a lot of cycling. I was doing up to seventy eighty miles a day...all of a sudden I got the whole feeling again... and I was struggling to walk a couple of miles...now I play tennis about twice a week, so, I play tennis for about five or six hours a week and I’m doing I’m doing weight training as well, for at least two hours a week’ (Pip).

Presenting such a stark contrast between pre-illness, illness and recovery abilities implies that it is the illness itself that has such a dramatic effect on the individual’s capabilities rather than any lack of motivation. To be able to say that one’s recovery can be assigned a percentage, or be measured in terms of the amount of exercise undertaken, helps establish the reality of the condition – it is something that can be counted or measured. In this sense it is helping place the liminal state of illness on a comparable footing to that of better established illnesses with measureable criteria. Moreover, by saying he or she is undertaking such an intense regime of physical activity the participant is able to consolidate the claim of recovery.

Across all the interviews, participants used subjective, yet meticulously quantified comparisons of their abilities pre-illness, illness and post illness to help present convincing accounts of their recovery. This also involved them resolving the problem of how to formulate the meaning of recovery. Approaches to this were very varied and often involved perceptions of how ‘normal’ life once again becomes after full or partial recovery: 
‘Being able to live a, sort of, normal life in as much as you would [have done], and to be able to do what you want, within reason, in a sensible way’ (Petra).
Whereas ‘normal’ is a construct that is open to individual interpretation, other participants were more specific about what would constitute a recovery:
‘I remember my doctor a long time ago said to me, ‘Oh, you know, what’s your definition?’ because, y’know, he was talking about, ‘Oh, you know, what’s your definition of being well?’ And I said to him, my definition of being well is being back at work part time and sailing at weekends. And that’s what I’m doing. (Dawn)
Conceptualising recovery in this way meant that participants separated themselves from being ill with ME/CFS and instead viewed themselves as occupying a category that was closer to being well:
‘I’m certainly active enough to play cricket and tennis and, y’know, do everything that a 42 year old bloke should be able to do’ (Nigel). 
Being once again able to engage in activities that peers and society may deem appropriate to someone of his age and gender allows Nigel to compare himself to ‘normal’ people and attest to his status as a recovered person. Dina also compares her activity to that of peers:
‘So we can actually lead a fairly normal life now, I regard it as normal anyway for my age [laughter], in fact a lot of my peers say ‘how do you do it?’, y’ know, ‘I can’t keep up with you and I haven’t got ME’, y’ know, [laughter]. Swimming Friday morning, and dancing Thursday evening, and crafts Monday morning and something else Tuesday and so on and so forth’ (Dina).
This also suggests that any prior lack of activity is because of the illness itself rather than any failure of motivation on her part, consolidating the notion that the former liminal state of illness was beyond their control.

In turn it appears that the participants regarded their ability to participate in normal activities as either an indication of becoming fully recovered or becoming part of a newly-constructed partially recovered category. However, unlike Turner’s anthropological formulation of the issue, there was no clear breakthrough into a post liminal state. For many it was necessary to engage in some form of illness behaviour in order to sustain a longer term recovery. This transpired to be a very individual process as definitions of and approaches to recovery were so variable, and, like self-driven recovery above, one which emphasised personal agency and resourcefulness. Participants signalled this by using phrases like: ‘it worked for me’, ‘people have to find their own way’ and it ‘may not work for everyone’. Again, this self-driven approach differed from recovery stories of other illnesses where recovery status is assessed and medically managed. Thus, without the imprimatur of medicine, or of one’s wider social circle who may express puzzlement, the recovering sufferer is navigating between socially sanctioned categories and experiences. In a sense, they are still in a liminal state.

The experiences of recovery were also liminal in that they sometimes appeared to contradict the guidance provided by ME/CFS groups and some medical professionals. Such information may suggest that maintaining a routine, pacing ones activities and not sleeping during the day all help with managing ME/CFS symptoms. Although participants generally indicated that they were aware of the advice they often supplemented it with their own system. Sally explains her individual approach to this below:
‘I sort of do boom and bust, so I don’t do pacing...I do overdraft and then, rest. Which works really well for me, I know it’s not what they say in the guidance’. I don’t know how the hell I’d hold down a job if I, y’ know, a nine to five type job if I had to do strict pacing? So, I don’t do strict pacing. I do everything wrong for four days a week and everything right for three days a week’ (Sally). 
Sally attributes her ability to participate in full time work to her own illness management system, which allows her to transcend the boundaries between being ill and being well. For Dina this was done on a daily rather than a weekly basis. She talks about the consequences of missing her daily rest below.
‘[I think to myself if] I don’t get an hour’s rest, now, and I’ve done it in the past...and by nine o’clock I am aching all over and desperate to go to bed. If I have done that [and] gone to bed at quarter to ten...I am awake by half past four, five in the morning and then I’m tired by eight or nine [morning] and it just throws me out completely. And so I think, well, stick to the routine that works and if it works for me then I will just keep doing it’ (Dina).
All of the participants similarly appeared to prioritise finding a way to participate in normal life. The fluctuating and differing nature of the illness meant that each person had their own interpretation of any advice from ME groups or medical professionals. Despite having these routines, participants indicated that they had to be careful about engaging in too much activity. 
Just prioritising what’s like...most important and what I can [do], y’know, not trying to take everything on, coz, I know that I can’t [do] as much as I want to. It’s quite a big thing to try and do isn’t I think? Yeah, coz everyone else can sort of do everything and they know that they’ll be fine but I’m pretty much ok I think it’s just I have to be careful’ (Izzie).
Other participants also demonstrated a similar mindfulness of their health, remaining vigilant for specific signs that could signal a return of ME/CFS regardless of their level of recovery such as ‘heaviness in my legs, the tightness in my muscles’ (Pip) or ‘hot tingly hands’ (Dina). Participants interpreted these signs as a warning that necessitated rest, treatment or therapy in order to stave off a relapse. For many participants these strategies formed part of their daily routine. Pip, who claimed to have been fully recovered from ME/CFS for twenty years said ‘I’m continuing with the meditation.... doing it twice a day again’. For others therapies or resting techniques were adopted on a more ad hoc basis.
‘I don’t push myself as much as I used to. Or that’s to say I do but just not all the time, and I balance that with rest so for instance I’ll, if I feel like I need to, I will go and meditate for half an hour or go and have a kip at lunchtime and these are the sorts of things that I wouldn’t even consider before’ (Nigel).
All this suggests that recovery is not merely a post-liminal state to be enjoyed unreflectively. From the participants’ point of view, it has to be carefully managed through a sustained consciousness of their long term health. In this respect the participants have not completely transcended their liminal state. Those who claimed to be partially recovered perceived their situation as being caught between two worlds as Sally commented ‘it’s the one foot in the well world, one foot in the ill world thing’.

People claiming to be fully recovered appear to regard themselves as well because of their ability to fully participate in life as ‘normal’. However, people who are partially recovered seem to have to shift regularly between the categories of being ill and being well in order to be able to participate in elements of normal life. This means that partial recoverees, especially, remain in a liminal situation, occupying a category of being ‘almost recovered’. Moreover, the need to engage in illness behaviour even among fully recovered participants means that they do not entirely escape the liminal situation of being ill with ME/CFS. They have not fully accomplished the transition into the social identity of a healthy person, and are therefore retain strong links with the liminal state. 

Trying to communicate recovery

Some recovered participants suggested that their empathy with ME/CFS sufferers and their awareness of the limited information and advice about recovery prompted them to feel responsible for advising others about this process.
‘if I could just help one or two people then I have done my part, coz I have felt better, and I would feel guilty if I didn’t share that knowledge or help at least one other person get better’ (Jack).
This, then, is reminiscent of Turner’s ‘communitas’ where sufferers are equally expert because of their experience and enjoy a degree of comradeship. Disseminating their recovery experience, which they felt could potentially help others, becomes important for the recovered individual:
‘I want to help in any way I can to get people to understand that [recovery is possible] without being insensitive because everybody’s condition is different’ (Nigel).
Having a knowledge and understanding of what it means to be ill with ME/CFS and then apparently get better puts recoverees in an awkward situation. Communicating the experience of becoming well proved to be difficult for many, especially where it had been accomplished through complementary or alternative techniques:
‘When I got better, and explained Professor Smith did for me, again, sort of look in disbelief, ‘Ah well, you know, how can that work when modern medicine can’t work?’ And, and, that, that was a bit hurtful too, really, as well, because I know, I know it worked, and…I just felt ‘hang on, why on earth would I make all of this up?’ You know. That, that was a bit sort of... very insulting really. Y’know, you think you’ve got some good friends, and then, when they kind of like, look at you, you know, in disbelief, you think, ‘well, are they good friends after all?’ [laughs] (Janet).
Janet’s experience recalls Tambiah’s (1985) and Douglas’s (1966) suggestion that people who straddle or transcend boundaries, for instance between being ill and being well, are apt to be stigmatised by society. The limits of communitas among sufferers were shown particularly sharply when participants recalled how difficult it was to communicate the illness experience to people that were still ill:
‘Interestingly there was a message board which I haven’t been on for many years […] A couple of us put our [recovery] experiences down and we said y’know please, please consider it and think about it and we got very, very abusive replies from people. It really got quite […] in the end y’know. My husband said y’know ‘that’s it you’re not going on again’, Because it was really upsetting that people really thought you were pulling the wool over their eyes, y’know, [they said] ‘you didn’t have ME in the first place’, ‘if you had ME like I’ve got ME it wouldn’t have worked for you’ etc, etc and just, just I got really upset about it’ (Mary).
Having their illness experience discredited, or diminished in comparison to the severity of other sufferers’ conditions, was a familiar feature of the ME/CFS recovery experience and participants reported finding this distressing. In Turner’s terms, this fracturing of communitas might be seen as signalling the end of the period of liminality, and the re-imposition of boundaries between illness and health with the recovered person on the healthy side. However, perhaps that is too simple in this case. For some this appears to mark a transition into a new phase of liminal identity:
‘At some stage you you have just say to yourself ‘OK that’s not the person I am anymore’ and and I’ve done what I can’’ (Mary).






Establishing oneself as a recoveree from ME/CFS is a complex process, the origins of which can be traced to the very beginning of the diagnostic episode. The notion of liminality illuminates much of the experience related by participants here, but there are also some important differences from Van Gennep’s and Turner’s original formulations. The experience of illness for a contested condition such as ME/CFS is marginal or liminal due to the degree of scepticism on the part of many doctors and laypeople, placing the sufferer ‘betwixt and between’ health and illness. Tellingly, Turner (1969: 94) describes the liminal phase as being a state ‘out of time’, which might be an apt description of the sufferer in an intense period of ME/CFS where the time structure of mainstream social life is untenable. The process of recovery or what Turner might call ‘reaggregation’ is thus a process of measurement and timing. How many hours of exercise can be sustained, how many days of work, or how many lengths of the swimming pool, for example. Moreover, many of the activities, such as work, tennis or dancing are fundamentally social ones involving other people, thus exemplifying Turner’s process of reaggregation into social structure. 

However, in contrast to Turner’s formulation, the resolution of the illness does not result in a clear cut transition to a post-liminal stage, but rather, may make the recovering person liminal in a new sense. Recovery is often a complex and precarious accomplishment. This second aspect of liminality has something in common with Mary Douglas’s Purity and Danger (1967), in that participants find themselves between or somehow bridging socially recognised categories. For participants, describing their recovered status involves managing dilemmas such as how to construct and communicate a recovery in the absence of recognised medical or lay criteria. In addition, in characterising what they meant by recovery, both full and partial recoverees, reported a need to attend to possible symptoms of fatigue, and undertake some illness behaviour in order to maintain a longer term recovery. Whereas the liminality proposed by Turner is perhaps most readily evident in the period of illness, the liminality experienced during recovery on the other hand is characterised by being in a transitional state between the categories of health and illness. This latter type of liminality falls between the communitas of self-help groups and the structured world of work and social life. In this respect it is reminiscent of Douglas rather than Turner. 

The transition to recovered status appears to involve a substantial element of self-awareness, self-definition and self-scrutiny. In this sense the state of the individual transitioning out of illness was different to the pre-illness self, in that it involved this relentless self-scrutiny, monitoring and pacing. Participants regarded being able to manage or reduce symptoms and participate in what they consider to be normal life as evidence of a recovery (Beaton et al. 2001) and a highly valued signifier of health. In Van Gennep’s and Turner’s terms, they have re-entered society at a different level – more mindful, self-aware and apt to measure performance against others or against their former selves.

Whilst being in the ambiguous position of being able to cross boundaries between illness and wellness may occasion disapproval (Douglas, 1967; Tambiah, 1985), for recovering participants in this study, this helped them manage the continuing elements of their liminal status and deflected some of the stigma attached to the illness experience. By choosing when, where and how to engage in illness behaviour, participants were able to resume parts of their normal life, which also enabled them to counter the stigma of hypochondriasis or malingering (Jackson, 2005). It may be that by stressing issues such as work, independence and their participation in activities that could be construed as ‘normal’ they felt they were somehow able to manage any negative responses from others. In recovery, the disability ceases to be the ‘master category’ (Grue, 2014) or a source of solidarity with other sufferers, thus breaching the sense of communitas with others who had remained in the liminal space. 

As we have described, this breach of the communitas meant that some participants claiming to be fully recovered described themselves as having incurred scepticism, and their original claims to have the illness and their recovery experience were discounted by ME/CFS group members. Therefore, in an important sense, recovery does not simply yield a post liminal identity, but introduces a new liminality to manage, because their status vis a vis the ME/CFS support groups and communities is brought into question. 

People in a liminal situation are often isolated from established social networks and therefore become reliant upon forming strong bonds and relationships with others in a similar situation – the communitas (Turner, 1969; Little et al, 1998; Thompson, 2007). By undergoing an experience that differs not only from the medically sanctioned categories of illness, but also the forms of intelligibility in the communitas of fellow sufferers, those who recover are placed in a position of unintelligibility. Indeed, they are reminiscent of Douglas’s (1966) dangerous creatures that pass through boundaries. 

It appears that their sense of being ostracised by the ME/CFS community in this way facilitates another feature of the illness experience by marking a point of transition between being ill and becoming well. Van Gennep (1909) and Turner (1969) might argue that these transitional stages represent the individuals’ reintegration into a recognised social category and mark the end of being ‘betwixt and between’. However, the reintegration does not entirely erase the illness experience, but represents a shift towards a more self-focussed phase reminiscent of Douglas rather than Turner. Thus, the recovered experience is still marked as different from the pre illness one, as participants report managing the demands they make on themselves, resting and responding to impending symptoms, like Anderson et al’s (2014) participants. 

Even participants identifying themselves as fully recovered had not undergone a clear cut rite de passage into a reaggregated state and retained some residues of their period of liminality. Instead, they had to be continually poised to reincorporate illness behaviour into their lives in order to maintain their recovered identity. For partial recoverees too, there was also no clear point of transition, which meant that they also found themselves moving into this second kind of liminality, rather like Little et al.’s (1998) cancer patients.

This paper shows that the notion of liminality offers some original insights into the recovery phase in the experience of ME/CFS, which has hitherto been neglected in the literature. A premium was placed by participants on resuming normality in work and social life. Partial recoverees were better able than those who claim a full recovery to maintain their relationships with ME/CFS support groups but, perhaps more than those fully recovered, remain in a sustained state of liminality reminiscent of Mary Douglas’s account of boundaries and the problematic status of entities that move between them. The relatively less well charted territory of this second kind of liminality suggests that more needs to be understood about the social aspects of the recovery experience from ME/CFS in order to provide assistance and support for those making the transition into the post liminal phase of being well.
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